Conference Abstract | Volume 8, Abstract ELIC2025419 (Poster 099) | Published: 05 Aug 2025
Munzali Shamsu1,2,&, Olukemi Titilope Olugbade1, Lois Oluwatoyin Olajide2, Dike Kingsley1,2, Lukman Isma’il2, Sa’adatu Aliyu2, Ali Wada Aliyu2, Mustapha Lawal2, Aliyu Hamisu2, Musa Hassan Muhammad3, Adama Ahmad1,2, Shakir Muhammadu Balogun1,4
1Nigeria Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Programme, Abuja, Nigeria, 2Department of Microbiology and Biotechnology, Faculty of Life Sciences, Federal University Dutse, Jigawa, Nigeria, 3Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, Abuja, Nigeria, 4African Field Epidemiology Network, Abuja, Nigeria
&Corresponding author: Munzali Shamsu, Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention. Plot 801, Ebitu Ukiwe Street, Jabi, Abuja, Nigeria, Email: Munzalishamsu0@gmail.com
Received: 31 May 2025, Accepted: 09 Jul 2025, Published: 05 Aug 2025
Domain: Infectious Disease Epidemiology
Keywords: Attack rate (AR), Case fatality rate (CFR), Infection prevention and control (IPC), Lassa fever (LF), Local Government Area (LGA), State Ministry of Health (SMOH)
©Munzali Shamsu Z et al. Journal of Interventional Epidemiology and Public Health (ISSN: 2664-2824). This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution International 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Cite this article: Munzali Shamsu et al., Descriptive analysis of Lassa fever outbreak in Taraba State, Nigeria: Epi Week 1 – 7, 2025. Journal of Interventional Epidemiology and Public Health. 2025;8(ConfProc5):00243. https://doi.org/10.37432/JIEPH-CONFPRO5-00243
The Lassa virus is the cause of Lassa fever (LF). It is an endemic in some states in Nigeria. Inadequate infection prevention and control measures, increases transmission of LF. In January 2025, the index case of the outbreak was reported from Bali, Taraba State. We investigated and contained the outbreak to assess its scope, describe, and implement public health measures.
We defined a suspected case as “any resident of Taraba State with severe febrile illness not responsive to the usual causes of fever in the area with or without sore-throat and at least one of the following: bloody stools, vomiting blood, bleeding into the skin and unexplained bleeding from the nose, vagina or eyes” January 1, 2025. We reviewed surveillance reports and hospital records. A standardized line-listing form was developed to capture clinical and demographic information of the cases. The aim was to contain and describe the outbreak in time, place, and person.
A total of 165 suspected cases, 70(42%) confirmed cases and 37(22.4%) deaths were recorded. Jalingo Local Government Area had the highest number of suspected cases 52(32%), Bali 35(21.2%) and Ardo-Kola LGA 20(12.1%). The highest number of confirmed cases were reported from Bali 23(33%), Ardo-Kola 15(21.4%) and Jalingo (14)20%. The majority of the cases were reported in epi week 4 and age group 15 – 24 years were the most affected with 30(43%) cases. A total of 46(66%) of all reported confirmed cases were males. Ardo-Kola had an attack rate of 10.9 per 100,000 higher than other reported LGAs. The overall case fatality rate (CFR) across the LGAs was 53%.
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